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1 | introduction
Fozzie Bear and Crazy Harry play a coordination game. Both players have switches in
front of themwith twopositions: Left andRight. Between them sits $1,000,000. Fozzie
has first move. He can either flip his switch or leave it as it is. Next, after learning what
Fozzie has done, Harry can either flip his switch or leave it alone. If the switches are
in the same position, then the money will be distributed between the players. If the
switches are in different positions, the money will be incinerated in an extravagant
explosion. To start, Fozzie’s switch is set to Left, and Harry’s is set to Right. The game
begins. Wanting the money, Fozzie flips his switch to Right. Seeing this, and wanting
the explosion, Crazy Harry flips his switch to Left. The money is incinerated.1
Many of us are inclined to say that Fozzie Bear’s flipping his switch to Right did not
cause themoney to be incinerated. Asked to explain why, it’s quite natural to say some-
thing like this: “Crazy Harry just wanted the explosion. So, had Fozzie left his switch
set to Left, Harry wouldn’t have flipped his switch to Right, and the money would have
been incinerated anyhow. So the money was going to be incinerated whether Fozzie
flipped or not—it was on a course to be incinerated either way—and Fozzie’s flipping
the switch didn’t make any difference.” This kind of response is incredibly natural,
but the study of causation has taught many of us to repress it. We’ve learnt to equate
‘making a difference’ with counterfactual dependence, and ‘being on a course to hap-
pen either way’ with the lack of counterfactual dependence. And we’ve learnt that
counterfactual dependence is not necessary for causation.
Waldorf has also rigged themoneywith explosives, andhe and Statlerwatch the co-
ordination game while cracking jokes from the balcony. Had Crazy Harry not flipped
his switch to Left, Waldorf would have detonated his explosives, and the money would
still have been incinerated. So the incineration does not depend upon Harry’s flipping
his switch to Left any more than it depends upon Fozzie Bear’s flipping his switch to
Right. Even so, many of us share the judgement that, unlike Fozzie, Harry did cause
the money to be incinerated. Waldorf ’s explosives were a backup for the incineration;
but that backupwas preempted by CrazyHarry’s flipping his switch to Left. The backup
would have been a cause, were it not preempted, but is not in fact a cause. In any case
like this, there will be causation without counterfactual dependence.
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Lewis (2004) concludes that we never had a good reason to think that Fozzie Bear
didn’t cause the money to be incinerated. He challenges those who think otherwise:
“if you ever accept preemptive causation, you must have learned to resist [the idea
that causation requires counterfactual dependence]. Why yield to it now?” (p. 99).
If we grant Lewis that these thoughts about Fozzie ‘not making a difference’ should
be understood in terms of the incineration not depending upon his action, then he
is correct. Our reason for not holding Fozzie causally responsible applies just as well
to Crazy Harry, who clearly caused the money to be incinerated. But it’s noteworthy
that, although there is a strong temptation to say that Fozzie didn’t make a difference
to whether the money was incinerated, there isn’t a corresponding temptation to say
that Harry didn’t make a difference. The temptation doesn’t arise; and, when forced to
consider the question, the thought I find most natural is: ‘If anyonemade a difference,
it was Crazy Harry’.
Here, I’m going to suggest an alternative way of understanding these thoughts
about ‘not making a difference’ and ‘being on a course to happen anyhow’. It builds on
the following rough and programmatic idea: while the money’s incineration already
had all it needed to occur without Fozzie Bear’s action, the same cannot be said for
Crazy Harry’s. Without Harry’s flipping the switch to Left, the money’s incineration
would have needed something additional from Waldorf in order to happen. When
we’re tempted by the thought that Fozzie didn’t make a difference, what’s true in this
thought is that Fozzie didn’t contribute anything which was needed—the money was
on a course to be incinerated without his action. In contrast, Harry did contribute
something which was needed—without Harry’s contribution, the money was not on a
course to be incinerated. (It is of course true that, hadHarry not given the incineration
what it needed to happen, Waldorf would have given it instead. Even so, Harry gave
what was needed, and Waldorf did not.)
In §2, I will say a bit more to develop this puzzle (what’s the difference between
Fozzie Bear and Crazy Harry?); I’ll show that cases like these give rise to a trilemma.
In §3, I’ll opt for one horn of this trilemma, which leads me to precisify the rough
and programmatic thoughts above into a theory of when some occurrence counts as
inertial—or, alternatively, when that occurrence was on a course to happen, or already
had all that it needed to happen. In §4, I’ll explain how this understanding of inertia
can be incorporated into a theory of causation I’ve developed elsewhere (Gallow,
forthcoming). In the appendix, I’ll provide a careful statement of the theory in the
causal modelling framework.
2 | preempters and self-underminers
When he flipped his switch to the Left, Crazy Harry did two things. Firstly, he caused
the money to be incinerated. Secondly, he kept Waldorf from incinerating the money.
Waldorf was a backup, potential cause of the money’s incineration. And this backup
was preempted by Crazy Harry’s actions. The structure of the case is similar to the
neuron system Preempter, shown in figure 1a.
The diagram there displays a simple mechanical system, consisting of a collection
of parts, called ‘neurons’, which can occupy one of two states: dormant or excited.
When a neuron passes from its dormant state to its excited state, I say that the neuron
has ‘fired’. The neurons on the far left—labelled ‘A’ and ‘C’—will either fire at t1 or
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(a) Preempter (b) Had C not fired
Figure 1
remain dormant. If a neuron fires at the time indicated beneath it, I color it grey. If it
remains dormant, then I color it white. Thus, in figure 1a, A,C,D, and E fire, and B
remains dormant. Arrows represents stimulatory connections between neurons. All
else equal, the neurons at their heads will fire if the neurons at their base fire. Thus, if
C fires at t1, then D will fire at t2. And if either B or D fire at t2, then E will fire at t3.
Circular-headed lines between neurons represent inhibitory connections. If C fires at
t1, then B will not fire at t2, no matter whether A fires or not. Figure 1b shows what
would have happened, had C not fired at t1 (that is to say: had C remained dormant).
Most people are inclined to say thatC’s firing caused E to fire in the neuron system
from figure 1a. Figure 1b shows us that E’s firing does not depend upon C’s. However,
this lack of dependence is due to the preempted backup, A. Had C not fired, A would
have caused E to fire. So A’s firing was a backup cause—it would have been a cause,
but for C’s firing. While the presence of this backup removes E’s dependence on C, it
doesn’t remove the causal connection between C and E.
Contrast this causal system with the one shown in figure 2a. There, the square-
headed connection between C and E is a partially inhibitory connection. If C fires,
then E will require two stimulatory signals in order to fire. So, if C doesn’t fire, then E
will fire if either D or F does. But, if C fires, then E will only fire if both D and F do.
Think about it like this: if C fires, this changes E into a dull neuron, which requires
two stimulations in order to fire. However, since both D and F fire, E receives two
stimulations, and so it does fire. Figure 2b shows what would have happened, had C
not fired. The relationship between C,D, and E in this neuron system is similar to the
relationship between Fozzie Bear, Crazy Harry, and the explosion. Just asD will fire iff
C does, so too will Harry flip his switch iff Fozzie does. And just as, given thatC and F
have both fired, E will fire iffD does, so too, given the setup of the coordination game
and the fact that Fozzie has flipped his switch to Right, the money will be incinerated
iff Crazy Harry flips his switch.
In this neuron system, C is a self-undermining preventer. Along one route, it
threatens to prevent E from firing; but, along another route, it undermines this ef-
fort. Once C fires, E requires additional stimulation in order to fire. However, by
makingD fire, C supplies this additional stimulation. It creates a need and meets that
same need. My judgement is that C’s firing is not a cause of E’s firing. If anything, I
am inclined to say that E fired in spite of C’s firing. I am not inclined to say that it fired
3 of 20
dependence, defaults, and inertia
(a) Self-Underminer (b) Had C not fired
Figure 2
because of it.
This is what I am inclined to say, but it’s worth noting that much of what I said
about C’s firing in Self-Underminer could equally well be said about C’s firing in Pre-
empter. In the case of Preempter, E would have received everything it needed to fire
from B’s firing. C’s firing keeps B from firing, and so, along one route, it takes away
needed stimulation from E. However, at the same time, by making D fire, C supplies
this stimulation. It creates a need and then supplies that same need. Nonetheless, I
am inclined to say that, in Preempter, C’s firing is a cause of E’s firing; and, in Self-
Underminer, C’s firing is not a cause of E’s firing. The question before us is: what is
the difference between Preempter and Self-Underminer? Why does C cause E to fire
in figure 1a, but not in figure 2a?
One answer to our question builds on the observation that, in Preempter, but not in
Self-Underminer, there is a backup cause of E’s firing. In Preempter, A is not actually a
cause of E’s firing, but, hadC not fired,Awould have been a cause of E’s firing. On the
other hand, in Self-Underminer, there is no backup cause of E’s firing. (It’s true that F
would have caused E to fire, had C not fired. But F is also a cause of E’s firing when C
does fire. So it is not a backup cause, as I’m using the term here.) This observation leads
to a hypothesis: the reason you have causation without counterfactual dependence in
Preempter is that the backup cause hasmasked the effect’s dependence upon the cause.
And with the masking of the backup removed, the causal effects of C’s firing will be
revealed through dependence. We might try to codify this into a principle: effects
depend upon their causes once any backup causes are removed.
Causation is Dependence in the Absence of Backups c caused e iff e counterfactu-
ally depends upon c when any backup causes of e are absent.
According to several contemporary theories of causation, causation is counterfactual
dependence in a counterfactual scenario.2 One way of thinking about this counterfac-
tual scenario is as one in which any potential backup causes of the effect have been re-
moved. For instance, according to those theories, in order to see thatC’s firing caused
2. Cf. Hitchcock (2001), Halpern & Pearl (2001, 2005), Woodward (2003), Hall (2007), and Halpern
(2016). Let me stress that none of these authors are committed to the principle Causation is Dependence
in the Absence of Backups, introduced below.
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(a) Symmetric Overdetermination (b) Had C not fired
Figure 3
E to fire in Preempter, you must first consider a hypothetical scenario in which the
backup A does not fire. In that scenario, whether E fires counterfactually depends
upon whether C does. From this, the theories allow us to conclude that C’s firing
caused E to fire.
The principle Causation is Dependence in the Absence of Backups is not a re-
ductive theory of causation, since causal notions show up on the right-hand-side. To
be a backup cause is to be something which doesn’t actually cause e, but which would
have caused e, were c absent. But non-reductive theories can be informative. Unfor-
tunately, Causation is Dependence in the Absence of Backups is too informative—it
is inconsistent. To see why, consider the simple case of symmetric overdetermination
illustrated in figure 3a. There, either A’s firing or C’s firing would have been enough
for E to fire, and both A and C fired. So E’s firing is overdetermined, and the overde-
termination is symmetric. By the symmetry of the case, A’s firing caused E to fire iff
C’s firing did, too. Suppose now that A’s firing did not cause E to fire. Since A’s firing
is not a cause of E’s, C’s firing is not a cause of E’s, either. But, had A not fired, E’s
firing would have depended on C’s firing. Causation is Dependence in the Absence
of Backups implies that counterfactual dependence is sufficient for causation. So, had
A not fired, C’s firing would have been a cause of E’s firing. So C isn’t a cause of E’s
firing, but would have been a cause of E’s firing, had A not fired. So C’s firing is a
backup cause of E’s firing. And, when this backup is absent, E’s firing depends upon
A’s firing. By the right-to-left direction of Causation is Dependence in the Absence
of Backups, A’s firing is a cause of E’s firing. Contradiction. So our assumption—that
A’s firing is not a cause of E’s—must be false. So A’s firing did cause E to fire. So A
is not a backup cause of E’s firing. Since there are no other potential backup causes of
E’s firing, E’s firing does not counterfactually depend upon C’s when all of the none
of the backup causes of E are absent. So, by the left-to-right direction of Causation is
Dependence in the Absence of Backups, C is not a cause of E. By the symmetry of
the case, A is not a cause of E, either. But this contradicts our earlier conclusion that
A is a cause of E. So Causation is Dependence in the Absence of Backups has led us
to a contradiction.
If we think that C’s firing caused E to fire in Symmetric Overdetermination, then
we will want to reject the left-to-right direction of this principle. We could then say
that backup causes are not the only things which can mask the dependence of effect
on cause. In cases like Symmetric Overdetermination, other causes can also mask this
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dependence. But here we must be careful—we might try to say that c caused e if e
counterfactually depends upon c when any backup or other causes of e are absent. But
this principle would tell us, falsely, that A’s firing caused E to fire in Preempter. For
E’s firing depends upon A’s firing when C’s firing—a cause of E’s firing—is absent. If
we wish to say that A is not a cause of E’s firing, then we must distinguish between
causes which mask the dependence symptomatic of causal processes (like C’s firing in
Symmetric Overdetermination) and those causes which disrupt causal processes (like
C’s firing in Preempter).
Theorists driven by the idea that dependence (perhaps masked) is the tell-tale sign
of causation have searched for other features to distinguish causes which mask from
causes which disrupt, but none of these theories will allow us to distinguish between
preempters and self-underminers in general.3 Indeed, my view is that none of the tools
we currently have lying on the table will allow us to satisfactorily distinguish Preempter
from Self-Underminer.
To explain why I think this, let me begin by encoding all of the relations of counter-
factual dependence between the neurons in these neuron systems in a system of struc-
tural equations. Structural equations like these lie at the heart of contemporary causal
modelling approaches to causation, and are discussed in more depth elsewhere.4 In
the case of neuron systems, all we need to know is this: for each neuron in the system,
we can find an associated variable which takes on the value 1 if that neuron fires and
takes on the value 0 if it doesn’t. Thus, the variable C takes on the value 1, C = 1, iff
the neuronC fires, andC = 0 otherwise. (I will use the same capital letter for both the
neuron and the variable representing its state. Context will disambiguate.) If a neuron
doesn’t have any connections feeding into it, say that both it and its associated variable
are exogenous. Otherwise, say that it and its associated variable are endogenous. Thus,
in Preempter, both A and C are exogenous, and B,D, and E are endogenous. A causal
model for a neuron system will assign each exogenous variable a value, and each en-
dogenous variable a structural equation, saying how its value is immediately causally
determined by the other variables in the system. For instance, the causal modelMP












E := [D +F > C]
(Here, ∨, ∧, and ¬ are the familiar truth-functions ‘or’, ‘and’, and ‘not’, and [ϕ] stands
3. See Gallow (msa).
4. See, for instance, Hitchcock (2001, 2007), Woodward (2003), Hall (2007), Pearl (2000), Halpern &
Pearl (2005), and Halpern (2016), amongst many others. See Gallow (2016) for my own understanding
of these equations.
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(a) Preempter (b) (c) Self-Underminer
Figure 4
for the truth-value of ϕ. Thus, the equation E := [D + F > C] says that E will equal
1 if the sum of D ’s value and F’s value is greater than C’s value, and it will equal 0
otherwise.)
Now, consider the neuron system shown in figure 4b. (Bear with me—my reasons
for introducing this systemwill become clear in amoment.) In this system, the neuron
E is special. The double lines around it indicate that it is a dull neuron. It requires two
stimulatory signals in order to fire. So, E will fire iff at least two of B, D , and F fire.
We can represent this neuron systemwith the following system of structural equations
(where, as before, a variable takes on the value 1 if its associated neuron fires, and it







E := [D +B+F > 1]
Many authors give theories of causation which are formulated in terms of causal mod-
els like these. You hand those theories a causal model, and they tell you whetherC = c
is a cause of E = e in that model. In Gallow (forthcoming, msa), I contend that
a theory of causation like this should be model-invariant, in the sense that its ver-
dicts shouldn’t change if the model is superficially changed by including or excluding
inessential variables. More carefully, I impose the following two constraints on a the-
ory of causation:
Exogenous Removal Invariance If an exogenous variable U is inessential in a causal
modelM, then C = c is a cause of E = e inM if and only if C = c is a cause of
E = e inM−U .5
5. Assuming, of course, that C ,U .
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Endogenous Removal Invariance If an endogenous variable V is interpolated in a
causal modelM, then C = c is a cause of E = e inM if and only if C = c is a
cause of E = e inM−V .6
In these principles, ‘M−U ’ is the modelMwith the variableU removed—and likewise
for ‘M−V ’. I give a careful definition of how to constructM−U andM−V fromM
in Gallow (forthcoming, msa). But I don’t think we need to be distracted by those
details here. When I remove variables from the modelM4b below, it should be clear
enough what I am doing. In general, I say that an exogenous variable U is inessential
iff, once it is removed, each remaining structural equation is a surjective function of
all of the variables on its right-hand-side. And I say that an endogenous variable V is
interpolated iff it has a single causal parent, P a, a single causal child, Ch, and P a is not
also a parent of Ch. (Again, see Gallow (forthcoming, msa) for further discussion.)
The important point for our purposes is this: if we begin with the modelM4b
and we remove, first the variable A, and next, the variable B, we arrive at the causal
modelMS , of Self-Underminer. That is: M
−A,−B
4b =MS . A is inessential inM4b and
B is interpolated inM−A4b . So, by the principles Exogenous and Endogenous Removal
Invariance, C = 1 should be a cause of E = 1 inMS iff C = 1 is a cause of E = 1
inM4b. Moreover, if we begin with the modelM4b and we remove the variable F,
we arrive at the causal modelMP . That is,M−F4b =MP . By the principle Exogenous
Removal Invariance, C = 1 should be a cause of E = 1 inM4b iff C = 1 is a cause of
E = 1 inMP . Putting these two conclusions together, we get that C = 1 is a cause of
E = 1 inMS iff C = 1 is a cause of E = 1 inMP . But we wish to say that C = 1 is a
cause of E = 1 inMS and that C = 1 is not a cause of E = 1 inMP .
We can make the same observation less formally as follows: In Self-Underminer,
we said that C’s firing would make E into a neuron which would fire iff both D and F
fired; and C’s failing to fire would leave E as a neuron which would fire iff either D or
F fired. But this is exactly what C accomplishes in figure 4b. If C fires, it inhibits B,
so E requires both D and F to fire in order for it to fire. And if C doesn’t fire, then B
fires, so E requires only one of D or F to fire. So, it looks like, if C’s firing didn’t cause
E to fire in Self-Underminer, thenC’s firing shouldn’t cause E to fire in figure 4b. Since
C’s firing didn’t cause E to fire in Self-Underminer, C must not have caused E to fire
in figure 4b, either. On the other side, since F actually does fire in figure 4b, E only
requires one more stimulatory signal in order to fire: either B orD will be enough. So,
if we ignore the neuron F and focus just on the neurons A,B,C,D, and E, then the
system in figure 4b is exactly like the system Preempter. So it looks like, if C’s firing
caused E to fire in Preempter, then C’s firing should cause E to fire in figure 4b. Since
C’s firing did cause E to fire in Preempter, C must have caused E to fire in figure 4b,
too. But nowwe’ve contradicted ourselves. C cannot both causeE to fire and not cause
E to fire in figure 4b.
Similar puzzles have been introduced by Hiddleston (2005) and Hall (2007),
who show that there are pairs of isomorphic causalmodels representing systemswhich
appear to differ causally. For instance, Hiddleston (2005) notes that we could use the
6. Assuming, of course, that V , C,E.
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to model both the case of Symmetric Overdetermination from figure 3a and the neu-
ron system shown in figure 5—which we can call Bogus Prevention (Bogus because,
given that A didn’t fire, C’s firing does not prevent E from firing). For this system of
equations to model Bogus Prevention, we just have to interpret the variables A and E
slightly differently. We can take the value A = 1 to stand for A’s remaining dormant,
and A = 0 to stand for A’s firing. Likewise, take E = 1 to stand for E’s remaining dor-
mant, and let E = 0 stand for E’s firing. (C = 1will still representC’s firing, andC = 0
will still represent C’s remaining dormant.) Then, A = 1 tells us that A doesn’t fire,
C = 1 tells us that C does fire, and E := A∨C tells us that E will remain dormant iff
either A doesn’t fire or C does.7 And all of this is true of Bogus Prevention. So it looks
like, if a theory of causation looks only at a system of equations, it will tell us that C’s
firing caused E to fire in Symmetric Overdetermination iff C’s firing prevented E from
firing in Bogus Prevention.8
When I showed this to Clark Glymour, he insisted that the problem was easily
solved by just figuring out what ‘God’s coding’ is—whether God prefers ‘1’ or ‘0’ for
firing. Those of us less confident in God’s existence or his preference for codings will
have to look elsewhere. Many have noted that, in this case, the values of the isomor-
phic variables represent importantly different states or events. When they are used to
represent Symmetric Overdetermination, A = 1 and E = 1 stand for the deviant events
of neurons firing; whereas, when they are used to represent Bogus Prevention, A = 1
and E = 1 stand for the default states of neurons remaining dormant. For these and
other reasons, several authors have suggested that, in order to give a theory of causa-
tion, we will need more information than a causal model provides; in particular, they
7. More carefully, ‘E := A ∨ C’ provides us with the following counterfactual information, for all potential
values of a and c: were it to be that A = a and C = c, E would take on the value a∨ c.
8. Even if you think thatC’s firing didn’t cause E to fire in Symmetric Overdetermination, you should still worry
about this observation. For even if C is not an individual cause of E’s firing, it should count as a joint cause
of E’s firing, along with A. (See Gallow, forthcoming, §3.) But C’s firing is not even a joint cause of E’s
failure to fire in Bogus Prevention. So these systems should differ causally.
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have suggested that we will need information about which variable values represent
default states, and which represent deviant events.9
However, when it comes to the argument above—the argument establishing that
C’s firing caused E to fire in Self-Underminer iff C’s firing caused E to fire in Pre-
empter—it doesn’t appear that this additional information will be of any help. In all of
the models under consideration, a value of 0 represents the default state of a neuron’s
remaining dormant, and a value of 1 represents the deviant event of a neuron’s firing.
Even knowledge of God’s coding is of no assistance here, for we’ve used precisely the
same coding—1 for firing, 0 for dormancy—throughout.
So our question (‘why does C’s firing cause E to fire in Preempter, but not in Self-
Underminer?’) can be crystallized into a trilemma. Wemay either (1) reject the princi-
ples Exogenous and Endogenous Removal Invariance, (2) reject one of our intuitive
judgements aboutPreempter and Self-Underminer, or (3) deny that a causalmodel gives
us enough information to say whether two variable values are causally related or not—
even when supplemented with information about which variable values represent de-
fault states and which represent deviant events.
This is not an easy choice. At the moment, I am most inclined to take the third
option. The first option raises pressing methodological questions which I do not see
how to answer. If a theory of causation is not invariant under the removal of inessen-
tial exogenous variables, then how will we ever know whether we’ve included enough
exogenous variables in our model of a given system? For almost every causal model,
we will be able to extend it by including some of the causal precursors of an exogenous
variable. If doing so may change the verdict of our theory, how far back must we go?
Likewise, if a theory of causation is not invariant under the removal of an interpo-
lated endogenous variable, how many variables must we interpolate along any given
path in the model? These are not rhetorical questions, but genuine ones. There may
be satisfactory answers, but I haven’t found any which satisfy me, and this inclines
me to reject the first option. (But I would be excited to see others explore it further.)
And, as I see it, the only way of making the second option palatable is to provide an
error theory for the mistaken causal judgement. That is: it would require explaining
away either our judgement that C’s firing didn’t cause E to fire in Self-Underminer or
our judgement that C’s firing caused E to fire in Preempter. Lewis (2004) offers an
error theory like this. His favoured theory says that C’s firing did cause E to fire in
Self-Underminer, and in his defence, he suggests that we only incline to the contrary
judgement because10 “[w]e note that [C’s firing] didn’t matter; [E would have fired]
all the more easily without it. The effect doesn’t depend on the cause. The idea that
causation requires whether–whether dependence may retain some grip on us.” I have
a hard time accepting this as an explanation for our differing judgements, for it points
to a feature which Preempter and Self-Underminer have in common. In both cases,
E would have fired without C. If the lack of dependence is enough to confound us
and corrupt our causal judgements, why isn’t our judgement about Preempter simi-
9. See, in particular, Kahneman& Miller (1986), Thomson (2003), McGrath (2005), Hall (2007), Hitch-
cock (2007), Halpern (2008, 2016), Paul & Hall (2013), and Halpern & Hitchcock (2015).




larly corrupted? Perhaps there is a satisfactory answer to this question—or perhaps
there is another, satisfactory error theory to be found. But I haven’t been able to find
either. While I am eager to see others explore this option, I am not inclined to explore
it myself.
So I am left with the third option. A system of structural equations does not tell
us enough to determine whether one variable’s value is a cause of another’s; and ad-
ditional information about whether those variable values are default or deviant won’t
help, either. There is something missing—something else which we must know in or-
der to determine whether C’s firing is a cause of E’s firing.
3 | inertia
As I foreshadowed in the introduction, I will suggest that the missing piece of the puz-
zle is whether E was on a course to fire, even without C’s firing—whether E already
had all it needed to fire without C. To coin a term: the missing piece of the puzzle is
whetherE’s firing was inertial or not. On the view I will develop here, causation is a re-
lation which holds between deviant occurrences and their non-inertial consequences.
So default states can never be causes, and inertial consequences can never be effects.
The reason why C’s firing didn’t cause E to fire in Self-Underminer is that, though C’s
firing is a deviation from the default, E’s firing was inertial (relative to the process lead-
ing from C to E via D). On the other hand, in Preempter, C’s firing was a deviation
from the default and E’s firing was non-inertial (relative to the process leading fromC
to E via D).
As a terminological aside: it will be important for me to distinguish what I am here
calling ‘default’ behaviour fromwhat I am calling ‘inertial’ behaviour. On the one hand,
there’s the state a system is normatively expected to be in—the state we could say it is
supposed to be in. This is what I am calling the default state of a system; any departure
from the default state I am calling deviant. I won’t have much to say about this first
notion here, beyond four cursory remarks. Firstly: what is normatively expected is
not the same as what is descriptively expected, or predicted. I can normatively expect a
sitting president to not incite an attack on the legislature evenwhile predicting that that
is precisely what he will do. Secondly: though we can offer some general, defeasible
rules,11 what is normatively expected of a system will depend upon a long and sundry
list of factors, and can vary from context to context. For this reason, things which are
appropriately cited as causes in one context may not be appropriately cited as causes in
another context. Thirdly: nonetheless, for the simple neuron systems we are looking
at here, we can take for granted that the default state of a neuron is to remain dormant,
and that firing is a deviant departure from the default. Finally: not all deviations from
the default are on a par. Some deviant behaviour may be more deviant than some
other deviant behaviour. When meeting the Queen of England, the default greeting
(for a lady) is to curtsy. Bowing your head (the traditional gentleman’s greeting) is a
deviant departure from this default behaviour, but belching the alphabet while dancing
the Macarena is a more deviant departure still. That is the first distinction—between
11. I am sympathetic to the defeasible rules offered in McGrath (2005), Hall (2007), and Hitchcock &
Knobe (2009).
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(a) (b) Prevention
Figure 6
what I call ‘default’ and ‘deviant’ behaviour. On the other hand, there is a distinction
between the state E is on a course to be in, without C’s contribution, and a state which
E was not on a course to be in, withoutC. This is the distinction between ‘inertial’ and
‘non-inertial’ behaviour.
To begin to get a feel for this distinction, consider the neuron systems in figures 6a
and 6b. The default state of both of these systems is for all of the neurons to remain
dormant. In figure 6a, the deviancy ofA’s firing propagates outward to E—E does not
remain in its default state. In this case, what is inertial forE is for it to remain dormant.
WithoutA’s contribution of deviancy, E was on a course to remain dormant. Contrast
the neuron system in figure 6a with the one shown in figure 6b. In this neuron system,
relative to the process connecting C’s firing to E’s, what is inertial for E is to fire. E’s
firing is a deviation from default behaviour, but nonetheless, given that A had fired,
E was on a course to fire, without C’s contribution. E’s failure to fire was non-inertial
behaviour, brought about by the deviancy of C’s firing.
One natural generalization from these two cases says that E’s inertial state is the
state E would be in, were C to not fire. However, this understanding would do noth-
ing to distinguish Self-Underminer from Preempter. In neither of those cases does E’s
firing depend upon C’s; so, in neither of those cases would this approach say that E’s
firing was non-inertial. Instead, I will suggest an alternative generalization which fo-
cuses first-and-foremost, not on dependence, but rather on the propagation of de-
viancy through a system. I will suggest that the reason E’s firing is inertial in the case
of Prevention from figure 6b is that E had already received all the deviancy it would
have needed to fire, were it not for C. That is: in the absence of C’s contribution, A’s
firing had already supplied enough deviancy for E to fire. This is the sense in which
E was on a course to fire, in the absence of C. And the sense in which E’s firing is
non-inertial in figure 6a is that, withoutA’s firing, E did not already have the deviancy
it needed in order to fire.
That’s a very rough-and-ready characterization. I’ll spend the rest of this section
getting more precise about it. In the first place, let me explain why I think inertial
behaviourmust be relativized to a process. Consider the neuron system shown in figure
7a. If we look at the process leading from C to E, through both B and D , E’s inertial
state is dormancy. In the absence of C’s firing, E has not received enough deviancy to
fire itself. So, relative to this process, E was not on a course to fire. However, consider
the process running from D ’s firing to E’s dormancy. This process is precisely like the
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(a) Short Circuit (b)
Figure 7
one in figure 6b. Relative to this process, E did have all of the deviancy it needed to fire
(from B). So, relative to the process leading fromD to E, E’s inertial state is firing, and
it is non-inertial for E to remain dormant. According to the proposal, this difference
explains why C’s firing did not cause E to remain dormant, but D ’s firing did.
Let me say more a bit more about this notion of a process. Consider the neuron
system shown in figure 7b. (As in figure 4b, E is a dull neuron, which requires two
stimulatory signals in order to fire.) Here, the firing of C has consequences which
propagate through the rest of the system. The routes along which these consequences
propagate are what I am calling a process. As I’ll use the term here, there are three
processes leading fromC’s firing toE’s firing in figure 7b. One process propagates from
C’s firing to E’s firing via B’s firing: denote that process with ‘C  B E’. Another
process propagates from C’s firing to E’s firing viaD ’s firing: denote that process with
‘C  D  E’. And a third process propagates from C’s firing to E’s firing via both B
and D ’s firing. Denote that process with ‘C B ED C’.
We can characterize this notion of a process with the aid of structural equations






To the right of the system of equations, I’ve drawn the associated causal graph, which
consists of four directed edges: C → B, C → D , B→ E, and D → E. In a graph like
this, a directed edge between two variables,U → V , tells us that the variableU shows
up on the right-hand-side of V ’s structural equation (the structural equation which
has V on its left-hand-side). A directed path from one variable,X, to another variable,
Y , is a collection of directed edges which lead from X to Y when oriented tail-to-tip.
For instance, in the causal graph above, both {C → B,B→ E} and {C → D,D → E}
are directed paths fromC toE. For ease of presentation, I’ll abbreviate the first of these
directed paths with ‘C→ B→ E’, and the secondwith ‘C→D→ E’. What I will call a
network fromX toY is just the union of any number of directed paths fromX toY . For
instance, the union of the directed paths C → B→ E and C → D → E is a network
from C to E. For ease of presentation, I’ll write this network ‘C→ B→ E←D← C’.
Take some network,N , and suppose that the directed edgeU → V ∈ N . Then, I will
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say that U is one of V ’s parents along the network N—or, alternatively, U is one of
V ’sN -parents.
With this notion of a network, we may now provide a characterization of a process
in terms of a correct system of structural equations. To see whether there is a process
leading from a variable C to another variable E, take any correct system of structural
equations which includes the variables C and E.12 Suppose that there is a network
leading from C to E with the following property: there is a way of assigning each
variable lying along the network a contrast value such that (a) E’s contrast is different
from its actual value, and (b) for each variable D , C lying along the network, with
actual value d and assigned contrast d∗, D = d, rather than D = d∗, depends upon its
N -parents’ values, rather than their contrasts.13 If that’s so, then we have a dependence
network leading from C = c, rather than c∗, to E = e, rather than e∗, via the network
N . Any dependence network leading from C to E represents a process by which C’s
value, rather than its contrast, is propagated to E’s value, rather than its contrast.
Dependence Network Within a structural equationsmodel, there is a dependence net-
work leading from C = c, rather than c∗, to E = e, rather than e∗, iff there is a
network leading fromC toE,N , and an assignment of contrasts to the variables
appearing alongN such that:
(a) C’s value is c, its contrast is c∗, and c , c∗;
(b) E’s value is e, its contrast e∗, and e , e∗; and
(c) for everyD , C alongN ,D ’s value, rather than its contrast, depends upon
itsN -parents’ values, rather than their contrasts.
After dotting all the ‘i’s and crossing all the ‘t’s, that’s a bit of a mouthful, but I
hope that the underlying idea is intuitive enough. A dependence network fromC to E
is just a (perhaps branching) chain of dependence leading from C to E. For instance,
consider again the neuron system from figure 7b. In the system of structural equations
provided above, C → D → E gives us a dependence network when each variable is
assigned the contrast0. ForE = 1, rather thanE = 0, depends uponD = 1, rather than
D = 0. And D = 1, rather than D = 0, depends upon C = 1, rather than D = 1. For
this reason, I say that there is a process leading fromC’s firing toE’s firing, viaD ’s firing.
(This is the process I earlier called ‘C  D  E.’) Similarly, C → B→ E← D ← C
gives us a dependence networkwhen each variable is assigned the contrast value 0. For
E = 1, rather than E = 0, depends upon B = 1∧D = 1, rather than B = 0∧D = 0.
Likewise, B = 1, rather than B = 0, depends upon C = 1, rather than C = 0; and
D = 1, rather than D = 0, depends upon C = 1, rather than C = 0. So there is a
process leading from C’s firing to E’s firing, via both B’s firing and D ’s firing. (The
process I earlier called ‘C B ED C’.)
12. See Gallow (msa) for more on what makes a system of structural equations correct.
13. More carefully, we should require that D = d, rather than D = d∗, locally depends upon itsN -parents’ val-
ues, rather than their contrasts. (See Gallow, forthcoming, §4 and the appendix.) The distinction between
dependence and local dependence won’t be relevant to any of the cases I will consider here, and so I’ll ignore




Figure 8: The octagonal neurons C and E can either remain dormant (as in figure 8a), fire
weakly (as in figure 8b), or firing strongly (as in figure 8c).
Process There is a process leading from c, rather than c∗, to e, rather than e∗, iff, ac-
cording to a correct structural equations model, there is a dependence network
leading from C = c, rather than c∗, to E = e, rather than e∗.
(A quick word on notation: throughout, I will use lowercase letters like ‘c’ and ‘e’ for
the causal relata. On my view, the causal relata are variable values. So, throughout,
I understand schematic expressions like ‘c caused e’ as shorthand for ‘C = c caused
E = e’, for some variables C and E with values c and e, respectively. Likewise, when I
say things like ‘c happens’, I understand this as saying that C = c.)
I’ve introduced these two terms (‘dependence path’ and ‘process’), and these two
notations (‘→’ and ‘’) to mark the distinction between representation and reality. A
system of equations represents a system—i.e., some chunk of the world’s causal struc-
ture. A dependence network is a part of this representation. A process, on the other
hand, is the thing in reality to which that part of the representation corresponds. It’s
important to notice that both dependence networks and processes are associated with
a series of contrasts. In the representation, these contrasts are alternative values of vari-
ables. In reality, the contrasts are alternative ways the parts of the world represented
by variables could be. These contrasts are an integral part of the process; different con-
trasts make for different processes. For illustration, consider the neuron system shown
in figure 8b. The octagonal neurons there are special; they can fire with two different
strengths, eitherweakly (indicatedwith light grey, as in figure 8b) or strongly (indicated
with dark grey, as in figure 8c). In figure 8b, there are two processes connecting C to
E. For we can either assign bothC and E the contrast of remaining dormant (as in fig-
ure 8a), or we can assign both C and E the contrast of firing strongly (as in figure 8c).
In either case, we have a chain of dependence leading from C to E. But the different
contrasts make for different processes. The first is a process whereby C’s firing (rather
than not) is transmitted toE. The second is a process wherebyC’s firingweakly (rather
than strongly) is transmitted toE. These two processes are importantly different, since,
along the first of these processes, C’s firing transmits deviancy to E. Whereas, along
the second of these processes,C’s firingweakly (rather than strongly) deprives E of de-
viancy. (I assume that firing strongly represents a greater departure from the default
of dormancy than firing weakly does, so that being made to fire weakly, rather than
strongly, is being deprived of deviancy.)
On the view I am developing here, causation is closely tied to the propagation of
deviant behaviour. What it is for c to cause e is for c to be deviant, and for this deviancy
to propagate from c to e. In order for c’s deviancy to propagate to e, c and e must be
connected by a process relative to which e is non-inertial, and its contrast inertial. That
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is: if c is a cause of e, then c caused e via some process. And, if c caused e via a process,
P , then e must be non-inertial, and its contrast must be inertial (relative to P ).
With this background in place, I can now say what it is for e∗ to be inertial, relative
to P . (I won’t have to give an independent account of what makes e non-inertial; for, if
e∗ is inertial, then ewill count as non-inertial so long as e , e∗.) I’ll begin with a rough,
first-pass gloss, and then go on to more carefully develop the account. Very roughly,
then: what it is for e∗ to be inertial, relative to P , is for e∗ to have all the deviancy it
needed to happen without c. Therefore, in order to show that c didn’t cause e along
P , it will be enough to show that e already had all of the deviancy it needed to happen
without c. To make that less vague: suppose you have a process, P , running from c
to e. Associated with this process will be some contrasts for c and e—call them ‘c∗’
and ‘e∗’. In order to see whether e∗ was inertial, relative to P , we must see whether or
not e∗ had all of the deviancy it needed in order to occur, without the contribution c
provided along P . So, to determine whether e∗ was inertial or not, we must consider
what things would have been like, outside of the process P , had c∗ happened instead
of c. Some things outside of the process P will be completely unaffected by whether
c or c∗ happens. For our purposes, they can be safely ignored. Other things outside
of P may have been less deviant, had c∗ happened. If so, this shows us that c has
transmitted deviancy along additional processes besides P . We should not hold fixed
the transmission of this deviancy. This is not deviancy that e∗ would have received
with or without c—it is deviancy directly attributable to c. Without c, e∗ would not
have had this deviancy. Finally, there may be things outside of P which would have
been no less deviant, had c∗ happened. These are c’s non-deviant consequences, external
to P . They are the consequences of c’s happening in place of c∗ which did not involve
the transmission of additional deviancy.
Non-Deviant External Consequences Given a process beginning with c, rather than
c∗, n is a non-deviant external consequence iff (a) n is not a part of the process,
(b) were c∗ to happen, n∗ would have happened instead of n, and (c) n is nomore
deviant than n∗.
(Non-deviant external consequences sub-divide into twokinds: (1) consequenceswhich
would have beenmore deviant, had c∗ happened, and (2) those which would have been
altered, but just as deviant, had c∗ happened. Things in the first category were inhib-
ited ormitigated by c’s happening in place of c∗. They represent respects in which c has
potentially deprived e∗ of deviancy being transmitted through other processes. Things
in the second category were altered by c happening instead of c∗, but this alteration
does not supply any additional deviancy to e∗.)
To determine whether e∗ is inertial or not, relative to P , ask yourself this: would e∗
have happened, were c∗ to happen while all of the non-deviant external consequences
of c were held fixed? If so, then e∗ is inertial, relative to the process P . If not, then e∗
is non-inertial relative to P , and the thing which is inertial relative to P is whatever
would have happened in e’s place, had c∗ happened while every non-deviant external
consequence of c were held fixed.
Inertial Suppose there is a process, P , running from c, rather than c∗, to e. Then,
e∗ is inertial iff the following counterfactual is true: had c∗ happened and had




Let’s apply this definition to our examples. Start with the case of Preempter from
figures 1a and 4a. There is a process leading from C’s firing (rather than not) to E’s
firing (rather than not) which goes by way of D ’s firing. For E’s firing depends upon
D ’s firing, which depends in turn upon C’s firing. Call this process ‘C  D  E’.
Relative to this process, B’s failure to fire is a non-deviant external consequence. For,
(a) B is not a part of the process CD E, (b) had C not fired, B would have fired,
and (c) not firing is no more deviant than firing. Holding B’s failure to fire fixed, had
C not fired, E would not have fired. So E’s firing is non-inertial, relative to the process
CD E.
Matters are different in the case of Self-Underminer, from figures 2a and 4c. In
this case, there is only one process leading fromC’s firing to E’s firing—the one which
goes by way of D ’s firing: C  D  E. This is a process because E’s firing depends
upon D ’s firing, which depends upon C’s firing. However, unlike Preempter, there are
no non-deviant external consequence of C’s firing. Holding all of the none of these
consequences fixed, were C to not fire, E would still fire. So, in Self-Underminer, E’s
firing is inertial relative to the only process connecting C’s firing to E’s firing.
The cases from the introduction are exactly parallel. Crazy Harry’s flipping the
switch was a deviant departure from what was normatively (though not, of course, de-
scriptively) expected of him. And there is a process leading from Harry’s flipping the
switch, rather than not, to the money’s being incinerated, rather than not. External to
this process, Harry’s flipping the switch had the consequence of Waldorf ’s not setting
off his own explosives. This consequence is strictly less deviant than Waldorf ’s setting
off his own explosives, which is what would have happened, had Harry not flipped. So
it is a non-deviant consequence of Harry’s act which is external to the process lead-
ing from his act to the money’s incineration. Holding fixed this non-deviant external
consequence, had Harry not flipped his switch, the money would not have been incin-
erated. So, relative to this process, the incineration of the money was non-inertial.
Matters are different when it comes to Fozzie Bear. While there is a process leading
from Fozzie Bear’s flipping his switch to Right to the money’s incineration (the incin-
eration depends upon Harry’s flipping his switch Left, which depends in turn upon
Fozzie’s flipping his switch Right), relative to this process, the money’s incineration is
inertial. For there are no non-deviant external consequences of Fozzie’s flipping the
switch; and, holding all of the none of these external consequences fixed, had Fozzie
not flipped, the money would still have been incinerated. So, relative to this process,
the incineration is inertial.
On the theory I’ve sketched here, this difference between Fozzie andHarry explains
why we are inclined to say that Fozzie’s flipping the switch didn’t make any difference,
even though we are not similarly inclined to say thatHarry’s flipping the switch didn’t
make any difference.14
14. There are similarities between this account of inertia and Yablo (1992, 2004)’s de facto dependence theory
of causation, as well as Hitchcock (2001)’s first theory of causation.
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4 | causation and inertia
In this section, I will sketch how this distinction between inertial and non-inertial hap-
penings can be integrated into a theory of causation. In particular, I will say how to
integrate it into the theory of causation I provide in Gallow (forthcoming). Once
emended, this new theory will agree with the old one about all of the cases I consid-
ered there,15 but it will disagree about Self-Underminer, Prevention, and some addi-
tional cases I’ll introduce below.
Gallow (forthcoming) proposes that c is a cause of e only if there is a process, P ,
connecting c to e such that c and e both are both more deviant than their contrasts
on P . There is an additional condition needed to transform this ‘only if ’ into an ‘if
and only if ’, but it won’t be relevant to any of the cases I’m looking at here, so I will
ignore it. In all of the cases I have considered or will consider here, the existence of
a process leading from c to e, with c and e more deviant than their contrasts, will be
both necessary and sufficient for c to count as a cause of e according to this theory.
(The additional condition is discussed in Gallow, forthcoming, §5.2.)
The distinction between inertial and non-inertial happenings may be integrated
into this theory by simply replacing the requirement that e’s value be more deviant
than its contrast, e∗, with the requirement that e∗ be inertial. The resulting theory tells
us that c caused e only if there is a process, P , connecting c to e such that (a) c is more
deviant than its contrast on P , and (b) e’s contrast on P is inertial. As before, there is
a third condition needed to transform this ‘only if ’ into an ‘if and only if ’, but, again, it
won’t be relevant to any of the cases we’ll consider her, so I will ignore it. For the cases
under consideration here, conditions (a) and (b) will be both necessary and sufficient
for c being a cause of e, according to the theory. (For the full theory, see the appendix.)
According to this theory, C’s firing did not cause E to fire in Self-Underminer.
While C’s firing is deviant, and while there is a process leading from C’s firing to E’s
firing (C  D  E), relative to this process, E’s firing is inertial (as we saw in the
previous section). E already had all it needed to fire, so C’s firing did not contribute
anything needed.
For the same reason, the theory tells us that Fozzie Bear’s flipping the switch to
Right did not cause the money to be incinerated. In order for Fozzie’s flip to count as
a cause of the money’s incineration, the incineration must be non-inertial, relative to
the process leading from Fozzie’s flip to Harry’s flip to the money’s incineration. But,
as we saw in the previous section, relative to this process, the money’s incineration is
inertial. Themoney’s incineration already had all it needed to happen, and Fozzie’s flip
did not contribute anything needed.
On the other hand, the theory tells us that C’s firing was a cause of E’s firing in
Preempter. For C’s firing is deviant, this deviancy is transmitted to E’s firing through
the process C  D  E, and relative to this process, E’s firing is non-inertial. C’s
firing contributed something E needed to fire—it’s true of course that, had C not con-
tributed this toE’s firing,Awould have done so. Even so, it wasC, and notA, that gave
it. So E’s firing was caused by C’s firing. Likewise, Crazy Harry’s flipping his switch to
Left was a cause of the money’s incineration. For this flip is deviant, and the deviancy
15. One exception is the case of Prevention, which the old theory failed to classify as an instance of causation.
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Figure 9: Preempting Preventer
was transmitted to the money’s incineration through a process relative to which the
incineration was non-inertial.
On this theory, if e, rather than e∗, depends upon c, rather than a less deviant c∗,
then c will automatically count as a cause e.16 For this reason, the theory will count
prevention as a species of causation. For instance, consider the case of Prevention from
figure 6b. HadC not fired, E would have. So E’s failure to fire depends uponC’s firing,
rather than C’s remaining dormant, and C’s firing is more deviant than its remaining
dormant. According to the theory, this is enough for C’s firing to cause E to not fire.
The theory also tells us that prevention is possible without dependence. Consider,
for instance, the neuron system from figure 9. In this system,A is a preempted backup
preventer of E’s firing. Had C’s firing not prevented E from firing, A’s firing would
have. Note that C  D  E is a process; for E’s failure to fire depends upon D ’s
firing, which depends in turn upon C’s firing. Note also that C’s firing inhibits the
spread of deviancy from A to B. B is not a part of the process C  D  E, so B’s
dormancy is a non-deviant consequence of C’s firing which is external to this process.
Holding this non-deviant consequence fixed, had C not fired, E would have. So E’s
firing is inertial, relative to the process C  D  E. So the theory tells us that C’s
firing prevented E from firing.
It’s natural to worry that this theory is too sensitive to irrelevant features of a sys-
tem. For an illustration of this worry, consider again Short Circuit from figure 7a. In
that system E’s dormancy is inertial, relative to the process C  D  E. But we
can easily change whether E’s dormancy is inertial by changing the way that C’s firing
causes B to fire. Suppose that, instead of directly stimulating B, C’s firing prevents a
potential preventer of B’s firing, as in figure 10. (Suppose, that is, that C’s firing brings
about B’s firing through double prevention).17 If we focus just on the neurons C,B,D,
and E, then the system in figure 10 looks exactly like Short Circuit: C causes both B
and D to fire, and while B’s firing threatens to make E fire, D ’s firing prevents E from
firing. But the theory tells us that these two systems differ causally. While C’s firing
is not a cause of E’s dormancy in Short Circuit, C’s firing is a cause of E’s dormancy
in figure 10. (For, in figure 10, H ’s failure to fire is a non-deviant consequence of C’s
firing; and, holding H ’s dormancy fixed, had C not fired, E would have fired.)
16. I won’t have the space to prove this here, but the interested reader may consult the proof of proposition A.1
from Gallow (forthcoming) to understand why this is so.
17. See Hall (2004).
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Figure 10: Short Circuit or Preempting Preventer?
It’s natural to think that changes in the way thatC’s firing causes B to fire shouldn’t
make a difference to whether C’s firing prevents E from firing. So long as double
prevention is a species of causation, it’s natural to expect that causation via double
prevention is interchangeable with more direct causal processes. But notice that, with
this change made, we can now see C’s firing as a preempting preventer, just like it is
in figure 9. Just as in figure 9, F’s firing creates a threat to E’s dormancy, and A is in a
position to prevent E from firing (by preventing B from firing). And, just as in figure
9, C’s firing preempts this backup preventer, and prevents E from firing itself. Had C
not fired, A would have stepped in and prevented E from firing. But, as it stands, it
was C, and not the preempted backup A, which did the preventing.
This is how the theory understands figure 10. If the theory is correct about this,
then the lesson of figures 7a and 10 is that themanner inwhichC’s firing causesB to fire
can make a difference with respect to whetherC’s firing prevents E from firing. This is
a surprising consequence of the theory. I wouldn’t have expected the fact thatC’s firing
caused B to fire via double prevention to be relevant to whether C’s firing prevented
E fro firing. However, on reflection, I’ve come to think that it’s not so surprising that
some surprising feature of the case is relevant to causation. For when I think about
figure 10, I have two, contradictory, inclinations: on the one hand, to view C’s firing
as a preemptive preventer, and on the other hand, to view it as a short circuit. At least
one of these inclinations must be misguided. It must be that, when I am in the grip
of one of these inclinations, I am overlooking something relevant to causation. And,
precisely because both inclinations are so natural, whatever it is that I am overlooking,
it is something relevant to causation which I wouldn’t have expected to be relevant to
causation.
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As I’ll use the term here, a causal model,M, is a 5-tuple, (S ,E ,u,≽,I ). S , E , and u,
are familiar fare from the causal modelling literature. S is a signature—i.e., a triple
(U ,V ,R), where U is a set of exogenous variables, V a set of endogenous variables,
andR is a function from each X ∈ U ∪V to the range of X,R(X), which is the set of
possible valuesX can take on. Given a set of variablesX, wemay defineR(X) to be the
set of possible assignments of values to the variables in X.18 E is a system of structural
equations, with one structural equation for each endogenous variable V ∈ V , and u is
an assignment of values to the variables in U . ≽ is a deviancy ordering. Formally, it is
a function from some tuple of variables X to a pre-order, ≽X, over the values inR(X).
The interpretation of this pre-order is that x ≽X x∗ iff X = x is no less deviant than
X = x∗. The least elements of ≽X are the default values ofX, and all other assignments
are deviations therefrom.19 I will return to I momentarily.
I will allow sets of variable values to serve as causes.20 So I must generalize the
notion of a network which I provided in the main text above. Say that a network from
a set of variables C to E is a union of directed paths from some C ∈ C to E, where, for
each C ∈ C, there is some directed path from C to E included in the union.
The definition of a dependence network must also be generalized. There is a de-
pendence network from C = c, rather than c∗, to E = e, rather than e∗, iff there is a
network, N , from C to E, and an assignment of contrasts to the variables along N ,
such that: (a)C’s actual assignment is c, its contrasts are c∗, and c , c∗; (b) E’s value is
e, its contrast e∗, and e , e∗; and (c) for eachD < C alongN ,D ’s value, rather than its
contrast, locally depends upon itsN -parents’ values, rather than their contrasts.
To understand what I mean by ‘local dependence’, take any endogenous variable
D included in the modelM. Associated with D will be some structural equation.
Let P ⊆ PA(D) be any subset of the variables appearing on the right-hand-side of D ’s
structural equation, with P def= PA(D) \ P being the remaining causal parents of D .
Then, we can write D ’s structural equation as D := ϕD (P,P), for some function ϕD .
Let p be the actual assignment of values to the variables in P. Then, we say thatD = d,
rather than d∗, locally depends upon P = p, rather than p∗, iff (a) D ’s actual value is d
and P’s actual values are p, D = d and P = p, and (b) changing P’s values to p∗ in D ’s
structural equation changes D ’s value to d∗, ϕD (p∗,p) = d∗.
Notice that, once a network N is specified, all we need in order to work out the
contrast value for every variable along the network are the contrasts for each C ∈ C.
For condition (c) in the definition of a dependence network assures us that, for any
other variable on the networkD < C, its contrast is the value d∗ such thatϕD (p∗,p) =
d∗ (where P areD ’sN -parents, p∗ are their designated contrasts, and p are the actual
values of P def= PA(D)\P). So, once the contrasts forC are settled, every other contrast
in the network is settled as well. So we can refer to a dependence network with a pair
18. Given a set of variables, X, an assignment of values to X, x, is a function which maps each X ∈ X to some
value x ∈ R(X). If x is an assignment of values to the variables in X, then I will write ‘X = x’ as a shorthand
for (∀X ∈ X) X = x(X).
19. As usual, we define x ≻X x∗
def= x ≽X x∗ ∧¬x∗ ≽X x.
20. See Gallow (forthcoming, §3).
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(N ,c∗), where c∗ are the contrasts assigned to the variables at the start of the network
N .
Suppose that two variables, D and R, lie along a network N , and that there is a
directed path outside of the network, O : D → O1 → O2 → ·· · → ON → R, such
that none of the directed edges in O appear in N . Then, call D a departure variable,
and call ‘R’ a return variable (relative toN ).
Now, we can return to the final component of a causal model: I . I tells us which
values of a variable are inertial, given any dependence network. As I explained in §3
above, a dependence network fromC to E corresponds to a process fromC to E. And,
given any process from C to E, there will be a value of E which is inertial, relative to
that process. Moreover, in the definition of inertia from §3, there was nothing special
about E other than that it lies at the end of the process. We could use the same defini-
tion to determine which values were inertial for any other variables along the process.
Take some variable, V , which lies along the process corresponding to (N ,c∗), and ask
yourself: had C = c∗ happened and had every non-deviant consequence of C = c ex-
ternal to the process been held fixed, would V have taken on the value v∗? If so, then
v∗ is inertial, relative to that process.
The point of the function I is to tell us which values of variables lying along a
process are inertial, and which are not. Formally, it is a function from a dependence
network, (N ,c∗), and a variable V along that network, to a value, v∗ ∈ R(V ). The
interpretation is that I (N ,c∗,V ) = v∗ iff v∗ is the inertial value of V , relative to the
process corresponding to the dependence network (N ,c∗).21
With this all in place, we may carefully state the theory:
Causation In a causal modelM = (S ,E ,u,≽,I ), C = c, rather than c∗, is a cause of
E = e, rather than e∗, iff there is some dependence network, (N ,c∗), leading
from C = c, rather than c∗, to E = e, rather than e∗, such that:
(a) C’s values are more deviant than their contrasts, c ≻C c∗;
(b) For any departure and return variables alongN , D and R:
(b1) D ’s value is more deviant than its contrast, d ≻D d∗;
(b2) R’s contrast is inertial, I (N ,c∗,R) = r∗; and
(c) (N ,c∗) isminimal; that is, there is no proper sub-networkN ′ ⊂N , begin-
ning with a subset C′ ⊆ C, such that (N ′ ,c∗|C′ ) is a dependence network
satisfying conditions (a) and (b) above.22
(Note that, if condition (b2) holds for every return variable, this implies that E’s con-
trast is inertial, so we need not include this as an additional requirement.)
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